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Abstract: The paper deals with a very complex analysis of the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea and its 
impact on other European countries. The analysis covers historical, social, cultural, religious, 
linguistic, economic aspects, which are put together in order to obtain the best description of the 
situation. This approach is one of the few others realised at this scientific level. The latest statistical 
data and information are used in order to support the analysis and its conclusions. There is a pertinent 
connection between the historical, social, cultural and economic environment in region. The main 
conclusion of the paper is that a compromise is possible with compensations for the other interested 
global actors, not only for Russia. Moreover, the present strategically, military and economic crisis‟ 
approach will be very important for the future events anywhere in the world. 
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1. General Approach  
The end of 2013 and the month of March 2014 mobilized the memories of March 
1937. The old dynamics of the German-Austrian “Anschluß” in the late 1930s 
agitated the minds as to a Russo-Crimean “annexation” in the 2010s. To be sure, 
the search for a resemblance, for a comparison, was easy, and much easier than an 
analysis that would integrate the changes of the world context in which the events 
were taking place. Disruptions affecting Ukraine are, however, essentially those 
affecting the whole arc of countries of the Eurasian “in-between”- space, which 
links the Baltic area, in the north, to the Black-Sea/South-Caucasus region 
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(Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey, nay 
Syria) in the east and in the southeast. 
Thus approached, the international crises in Georgia (during 2008), that in Ukraine 
(since 2013) and other internal tensions that arouse international interest (Turkey, 
Iran, Syria, Belarus) light up in a new way, the spotlight of the last phase of the 
establishment of the New International Order of the post-Cold War, against the 
backcloth of Chinese power and Sino-US latent rivalry. Civil and political 
confrontations within Ukraine are part of the crisis, but this crisis is primarily 
international, specifically continental, according to the main hypothesis of this 
article, and it is a crisis situated at the gateway to the “New Asia” (Chabal, 2015). 
This hypothesis thus “situates” this crisis, in turn, out of the history of the 20th 
century alone and fully within the new configurations, those of “the Sino-Russian-
European 21st century”. 
At first sight, the tension in Ukraine, the referendum in Crimea and the 
“reattachment” of the peninsula to Russia seemed an open surprise. The concept of 
“annexation” or Anschluß was spontaneously used in the western/European press. 
However, international politics and events are oftentimes essentially ambiguous 
and it is never clear what to make of them, especially when involving historical 
“origins” of events. The fact that Crimea was Russian until 1954 is true; the fact 
that the Soviet empire no longer corresponds to present border-designs is also true. 
To be sure, Russia‟s justification is as ambiguous in her stance on Crimea (and 
eastern Ukraine, and eastern Moldova) as it would be (?) on northern Kazakhstan, 
but, equally certain is the ambiguity of the (lack of) capacity of other States in the 
region and in the world as to how to react to that stance on Crimea and Ukraine. 
And so, as often in academic analysis, when facts are uneasy to understand, one 
would be well-advised to revert to theoretical views. Our contention in this article 
is that one ought to mobilise concepts, among them some classic ones from 
geopolitics and their derivatives, to make sense of Russia‟s stances in the 2010 
before analysing the impact, particularly in economic terms, of Russia‟s s move 
into Crimea in 2013/2014.  
Nowadays, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia covers political, military, 
social and economic aspects. The main question related to this crisis is how deep is 
this conflict and which are its challenges for the international community? 
There are a lot of articles, interviews and statements concerning the Ukrainian 
crisis. On the other hand, there are not large scientific analyses focused on it. 
This paper offers a complex political and economic analysis based on the latest 
official data and considers that the greatest challenges for Ukraine and the 
international community will started at the end of the military conflict in region. 
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2. Critical Overview of the Literature  
2.1. The Geopolitical Causes of Russia’s Stance in the 2010s 
Rather than reverting to immediate news reports, made worse by acute journalistic 
sensationalising of the facts, it is suggested to extract the necessary elements of 
discussion from theories that link space and power. The link between territory, as 
physical space, and power, as the capacity to dominate and impose one‟s view, is 
provided by geopolitical thinkers. We need to browse through classic geopolitical 
concepts (1), adapting some of them in particular, in order to seek to provide a 
fine-tuning of unfolding geopolitical dynamics (2). 
 
2.1.1. Classic Concepts: Adapting some Geopolitical Classics 
Classic thinkers, contributors from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some of 
them German, some others Anglo-American, provide us with five views of the 
relevance of the physical space or territory. Let us remind ourselves of how these 
views relate to the events of Eurasia in general and with those in and around 
Ukraine in particular. It will then be possible, in each case, to state and discuss, to 
use and refute these views and suggest an analysis of the dynamics since 2013 in 
Ukraine as case-study of the European-Asian interface. 
a)- vital-space :  expansion / losses of 1991 lack of space 
The issue of space in geopolitics is addressed as a territory animated by a State, 
according to the view of F. Ratzel (1844-1904)
1
. That is, all States are in a struggle 
for space and seek to increase their territory in order to access more resources. This 
classic idea that States, as a rule, extend into their neighbours, has a countervailing 
significance: any State having lost territory will be driven to reacquire it, as if 
expansion was an unstoppable trend. Applied to the case of today‟s Russia, it is 
easy to see how this approach suggests that not only is the recent reattachment of 
Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 relevant to “reactive” geopolitics but also that, from the 
Russian point of view, 1991 has meant a large-scale loss of territory, namely that 
land conquered from the 16th century and the accesses to various sees in the world 
(Baltic, Black, Caspian, Okhotsk, …) to the 19th century and mastery of the whole 
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political geography, in Progress in Human Geography, 11/4, 1987 ; J. Brunhes, Friedrich Ratzel 
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of Siberia and part of Manchuria. From the loss of space to the lack of space, 
especially to the subjective nature of the feeling of a lack of space in very large 
States, there is only a narrow margin. 
b)- reconstruction power / former scenarios / from 16th century 
As to power in classic geopolitical views, K. Haushofer
1
 (1869-1946) suggests that 
not only can power be constructed but that it can also be reconstructed. And so, the 
Japanese scenario of the late 19th century, the German scenario of the 1930s and, 
maybe, the Russian scenario of the 2010s would bear some resemblance. This calls 
for nuances. Comparisons are about looking in parallel at facts that are linkable to 
some analysis, not at identical facts. That Russia, having been the greatest land-
power of the 19th century and the inspirer of the Soviet Empire, would seek to 
reconstruct its influence and might over the continent is not illogical. Haushofer 
would most probably, if he were to share his views with us today, contend with the 
logic present in the tough stance over Crimea and eastern Ukraine: geopolitics is 
less concerned with Westphalian legal rules than with the attempt to reach power, 
which is, according to another of Haushofer‟s views, by essence, an attempt at 
hegemony, that is absolute power. Relative power is but one stage to the realisation 
of power, in a deterministic realist approach. 
c)- maritime  projection // access to sea // for land power 
Power can also be hegemonic by combining sea-power and land-power. The 
former, referred to as “maritime power” for A. Mahan (1840-1914)2, consists of a 
capacity to “project” power across the seas and eventually overseas, whether in a 
colonial or neo-colonial way. Continental powers, however, such as Russia - and 
China for that matter-, usually seek sea power less in order to project their power 
overseas than to exercise a capacity to patrol in their own waters “extended” over 
the dominance of “relevant seas”, of which the Black sea is obviously one for 
Russia. The events of 2008 in Georgia remind us of the importance for Russia of 
the military port of Batumi in Georgia; those of 2014 of that of Sebastopol in 
Crimea (and the southern China sea for China). From the point of view of Russian 
geopolitics over the long, multi-secular scale, there is no alternative to dominating 
                                                     
1 Das Japanische Reich in seiner geographischen Entwicklung, Vienne, Seidel & sohn, 1921; 
Weltpolitik von heute, Zeitgeschichte-Verlag Wilhelm Undermann, 1934; Weltmeere und 
Weltmächte, Berlin : Zeitgeschichte Verlag, 1937; Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen 
Bedeutung, Berlin, Vowinckel, 1939; Japan baut sein Reich, Berlin : Zeitgeschichte-Verlag Wilhelm 
Undermann, 1941. 
2 The Gulf and Inland Waters (1883); The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (1890) ; 
The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812 (1892) ; The 
Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897); Lessons of the War with Spain, and 
Other Articles (1899); The Problem of Asia and Its Effect Upon International Policies (1900); 
Reflections, Historic and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea, (1906) in Proceedings 
magazine, US Naval Institute, June 1906. 
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the Black sea and that dominance calls for the control of Crimea. Two Balkan wars 
(1912) and, before that, the long, historical confrontation with the Ottoman Empire 
had the same purpose. 
d)- heartland  key // key to back sea // and Mediterranean // as maritime Europe 
Another theorist of the fact that sea-power complements land-power, H. 
MacKinder (1861-1947)
1
 , rigidifies the power relations between the powers of the 
sea (England of the 18th-19th c.) and those of the land (Germany of the late 19th 
c.). He further suggests a deterministic, sequential dynamic for dominating the 
continent, from Eastern Europe to the heartland, to the Eurasian space and to the 
world. On the way „from‟ Germany „to‟ central Asia, the Ukrainian plain seemed 
to him the space for mobility par excellence. In this perspective, it is clear that 
Russia has traditionally as much intent on Central Asia as the “continuation” of 
land as she does over the Black Sea as the “continuation” of access to the maritime 
space, from the Black Sea to the Bosporus, the Eagan Sea and the Mediterranean 
and, from there, to the Atlantic, as a complement to the access to the Atlantic from 
the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. This long-term perspective takes away much, if 
not all, of the contemporary tensions as attributable to a particular type of 
leadership or another. 
e)- periphery  contain // expansion of NATO // (Baltic, Central Europe, 
Rumania) 
The drive to expansion from the center triggers, according to the vision of N. 
Spykman (1893-1943)
2, a „containment‟ from the periphery. History reminds us 
that if the ambitions of the periphery to conquer the central Asian space have failed 
(ancient Greece, modern France, Japan, Germany), on the other hand when the 
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Geopolitics in US Strategic Policy, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988; G. R. Sloan, "Sir Halford 
Mackinder: the heartland theory then and now", in Gray C S and Sloan G.R., Geopolitics, geography 
and strategy. London: Frank Cass, pp. 15–38; Pascal Venier, La pensée géopolitique de Mackinder, 
apôtre de la puissance amphibie, in Coutau-Bégarie (dir.), Approches de la géopolitique, Paris, 
Economica, 2013, pp. 483-507 ; Pascal Venier, The Geographical Pivot of History and Early 20th C. 
Geopolitical Culture, in Geographical Journal, vol. 170, no 4, décembre 2004, pp. 330-336. 
2 The Geography of the Peace, New York, Brace and Company, 1944; America's Strategy in World 
Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, Brace and Company (1942); “The Social 
Background of Asiatic Nationalism”, in The American Journal of Sociology 1926, issue 3; “States‟ 
Rights and the League”, in The Yale Review 1934, issue 2; “Geography and Foreign Policy, I-II”, in 
The American Political Science Review 1938, 1-2; with A. Rollins, “Geographic Objectives in 
Foreign Policy, I-II”, in The American Political Science Review 1939, issue 3-4; “Frontiers, Security, 
and International Organization”, in Geographical Review 1942, issue 3. 
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centre attempted to dominate the continent (Middle-Age Mongolia, modern 
URSS), it could not do so for longer than several decades. The concept of 
„containment‟ helps analyse the cold war as a geopolitical occurrence. Further, the 
periphery is a kind of amphibious buffer zone separating the properly maritime 
powers (England, United States) from the properly land powers (Russia, China), 
which brings shades into the black-and-white Manichean suggestion that Russia is 
„wrong‟ in viewing Crimea as space of Russian control and Europe is „right‟ in 
contesting that view. Russia is simply containing European/NATO enlargement of 
influence (Baltic States, Central Europe, Rumania and Bulgaria) and Europe is 
simply containing desires of Russia to compensate the losses of 1991 with a 
Eurasian economic space. 
These reminders allow us to take into consideration, further, some more 
contemporary, geopolitical concepts and similarly apply them to the situation of 
Russian initiatives in the eastern Balkans. These are drawn from French authors, 
not because they would offer a „better‟ view but because they suggest a welcome 
diversity of views and a number of potential analyses. 
 
2.1.2. Concepts Updated: Fine-Tuning Geopolitical Dynamics 
Contemporary authors, from the last quarter of the 20th century, active within 
French academia and research, provide us with about ten modern views of 
geopolitical dynamics. They are not chosen here because they share a nationality 
among themselves (and with the author of the part I of the article), but because they 
offer an array of views and analyses, that complement rather well the over-
accepted views that the physical territory is the key to geopolitics. What is 
suggested is that there are many other determinants than the sheer material space. 
intentions  admitted or real/ prevent domino effect / Ukraine, Georgia  West 
One such determinant consists of the „real‟ intentions of actors, beyond their 
admitted intentions, often in the form of governmental rhetoric. This factor, which 
Y. Lacoste (1929-)
1
 brings to the fore, suggests, beyond material, territorial 
determinants. Russia‟s real motive in Ukraine and Crimea is most probably to 
prevent the novel domino-effect of countries in the former soviet zone and the CIS 
space joining, one after the other, the western space (whether European or Atlantic) 
dynamic, with now Belarus (and soon Armenia) „secured‟ in the Customs Union 
                                                     
1 Les Pays sous-développés, 1959; Géographie du sous-développement, 1965; La géographie, ça sert, 
d'abord, à faire la guerre 1976; Dictionnaire de Géopolitique, 1993; Dictionnaire géopolitique des 
États, 1994; La Légende de la terre, 1996; Vive la Nation ! - Destin d'une idée géopolitique, 1998; 
Géopolitique. La longue histoire d'aujourd'hui, 2006; L'Eau dans le monde: les batailles pour la vie, 
2006; La question pos-coloniale : une analyse géopolitique, 2010. 
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and the EEC. The real motive of the West is to secure Ukraine in the European-
Atlantic dynamic, realising that, in the 21st century, countries‟ decision to adhere 
to one or the other geopolitical space (West or East) is likely to be a long-term 
clarification. From this point of view, what happened in Crimea and what is 
happening in Ukraine has a significance which reaches far beyond these territories 
and all the way to countries situated in the “arc” in between East and West. It is 
unlikely that these real intentions subside. 
b) borders  typical // Soviet/Russian with Crimea as link 
The acute tension of this early 21st century marks the fact that borders are again 
the subject of nationalist and military moves. M. Foucher (1946 -)
1
 looks as the 
border-dimension of conflicts. He suggests a simple question: why should a border 
be stable? and a simple answer : borders, being the products of the unequal history 
of victors and losers, are bound to be questioned, sooner or later. From the Russian 
viewpoint, 1991 has caused a reshuffling of borders in the Baltic northwest, in the 
Centralasian southeast, in the Caucasian south, very uncomfortable at that, given 
five centuries of expansion. Conversely, 1991 has brought, in the West, a renewed 
awareness that the time has come (?) to contain post-soviet Russia in zero-sum 
games, probably untimely in these modern times of multilateral regionalisation, no 
longer times of sovereignist antagonisms. The West and the EU have more to bear 
in mind by way of Russian competition: the Eurasian economic space is already 
linking the „in-between‟ countries (Belarus, Armenia) and central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan) to Russia. 
c) structuration  of space / maritime as continuation of Russian land 
The resemblance of maritime to terrestrial space, suggested by H. Couteau-Bégarie 
(1956-2012),
2
 historian of the seas and naval confrontations, enables us to 
                                                     
1 L‟Invention des Frontières, FEDN, 1986; Fronts et Frontières, un tour du monde géopolitique, 
Fayard, 1988, 1991; (sous la dir.) Fragments d'Europe-Atlas de l‟Europe Médiane et Orientale, 
Fayard, 1993; (sous la dir.) L‟Europe Prochaine, essai sur les alternatives et les stratégies pour une 
nouvelle vision de l'Europe, Fondation BBV, Madrid, 1994; Les Défis de Sécurité en Europe 
Médiane, FED, Documentation Française, Paris 1996; La République européenne. Entre histoires et 
géographies, Belin, Paris, 1999; (sous la dir.) Asies nouvelles, Belin, 2002; L‟Europe et l‟Avenir du 
monde, Éditions Odile Jacobs, 2009; L‟Europe entre géopolitiques et géographies (dir.), Armand 
Colin, CNED, SEDES, 2009; Nouveaux (dés)équilibres mondiaux, La Documentation Française, oct. 
2009; L‟Obsession des frontières, 3e édition, Tempus Perrin, janvier 2012. 
2 La puissance maritime soviétique, Economica, 1983, 1998; Le phénomène « Nouvelle Histoire ». 
Stratégie et idéologie des nouveaux historiens, Economica, Paris, 1983, 1999; Le problème du porte-
avions, Economica, 1990; Le désarmement naval, Economica, 1995; L‟histoire maritime en France, 
Economica, 1998; L‟œuvre de Georges Dumézil, Economica, 1998; La lutte pour l‟empire de la mer, 
Economica, 1999; L‟évolution de la pensée navale Vol. 7, Economica, 1999; Pensée stratégique et 
humanisme, Economica, 2000; Géostratégie du Pacifique, Economica, 2001; Traité de stratégie, 3e 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol 11, no 2, 2015 
 
 114 
understand that, from a geopolitical viewpoint, whether under State sovereignty 
(land) or with an open international legal status (high sea), space “structures” 
ambitions and initiatives, land being itself structured and competitive : sea-lanes as 
much as land-corridors. Applied to Russian geopolitical visions of maritimity, this 
suggests the Black Sea and Crimea to be both a „continuation‟ of Russian territorial 
management. „Continuation‟ is a much connoted word since Clausewitz‟ famous 
„war is the mere continuation of politics with other means” (K. Von Clausewitz, 
2013). Here, war is not necessarily the main characteristic of the unfolding 
ambition but one of the forms taken by this ambition. The recent Russia-inspired 
Eurasian Economic Community is a much more serious contender of rivalry with 
Europe and “the West”: in 2013, instability in Ukraine started precisely when the 
idea of an “association” of Ukraine to the EU became fashionable. 
d) geo-economics  recovery after crisis // 90s: Russia in crisis/ 2000s: Europe in 
crisis = opportunity 
In a geo-economic perspective of “de-territorialisation”, for instance with Ph. 
Moreau-Desfarges (1943-)
1
, actors are viewed no longer in terms of the “rapport” 
to the territory as a power-base but of the impact of economic stability or cyclical 
downturns on their status vis-à-vis other actors. In this vein, if Russia underwent in 
the 1990s an economic crisis when Europe was doing better, the reverse occurred 
in the 2000s with the Russian economy benefiting from higher world prices for 
energy (Russia is among the major world producers of natural gas and crude oil) 
and Europe in the deepest economic and monetary upheaval since its creation. A 
Europe in crisis is an opportunity for any actor wishing to adopt assertive stances 
over the interests of weaker competitors and if Ukraine was perceived as a possible 
„associate‟ partner to the EU, non-European contestation of that possibility 
manifested itself more when the EU was weakened in/since 2008. With oil prices 
going down again, Russia is probably getting more determined in this stance vis-à-
vis Ukraine and the Balkans. 
e) grey zones  face of citizens: Russian passport issue = South-Ossetia 2008 
International situations bear upon citizens in any territory, who often suffer from 
open conflicts among state decision-makers. From a humanitarian point of view, 
                                                                                                                                       
édition, Economica, 2002; Le meilleur des ambassadeurs, théorie et pratique de la diplomatie navale, 
Economica, 2007; Approches géopolitique, Economica, 2013 en collaboration avec Martin Motte. 
1 Relations internationales, collection "Points-Essais", Le Seuil, 7ème edition, 2007; Introduction à la 
géopolitique, collection "Points-Essais", Le Seuil, 2e édition, 2005; Dictionary of Geopolitics, 
Armand Colin, 2002; Repentance et Réconciliation, Presses de Sciences Po, 1999; La mondialisation, 
PUF, collection "Que sais-je ?" n°1687, 8ème édition, 2010; L‟ordre mondial, Armand Colin, 3e 
édition, 2003; La gouvernance, collection "Que sais-je ?" n° 3676, PUF, 3e édition, 2008; Où va 
l‟Europe ?, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006; Droits d‟ingérence, Presses de Sciences Po, 2006; La 
guerre ou la paix demain ?, Armand Colin, 2009. 
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J.C. Rufin (1952-)
1
 devised the concept of “grey zones” to qualify portions of a 
territory which escape the control of public authorities and where various forms of 
violence set in and disrupt the normal course of life. The fate of citizens becomes 
trapped and engulfed in possible manipulations dictated more by geopolitical 
interests than by humane motives. In Georgia, South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
2008, in Crimea, Ukraine and east-Moldova from 2014, the fact that citizens are 
Russian-speakers was equated with their longing to revert to the Russian 
nationality and to see their living space attached to the Russian Federation. 
Humanitarian concerns go to citizens with differing views, intent on remaining 
within the existing sovereignty, since their uprooting does not agree with the 
stability or protection to which they are entitled. Whatever the inter-governmental 
dynamic, war-like actions have cause many casualties and deaths. 
f) regional geopolitics  specificity : “in between” West/East - East/West 
Or, is there specificity of the Balkans and of the Black Sea that would suggest a 
sub-regional geopolitics different from that of other regions? Inspired by F. Joyaux 
(1938-: Asia would be a region with lines of divide equating physical, civilizational 
and cold-war political traits when, elsewhere, these divides do not match)2, we 
should deepen the hypothesis that Ukraine today belongs to the arc of countries 
“in-between” East and West, an arc mentioned in the introduction to this part I of 
the paper. Indeed, in the post-cold war, such an arc exists in between i) an Asia that 
extends West as the “Shanghai dynamic” of the SCO has affiliations encroaching 
upon the CIS space (Belarus, …) as well as into the Middle East (Iran, …) and as 
the EEC has affiliations with the region (Armenia, …) and ii) a Europe that extends 
East as the EU, the OSCE and NATO have enlargements into the former soviet 
zone and into continental Asia. Physical or civilizational dimensions apply less 
                                                     
1 Le Piège humanitaire – Quand l'humanitaire remplace la guerre, éd. J.-Cl. Lattès, 1986; L'Empire et 
les Nouveaux Barbares, éd. J.-Cl. Lattès, 1991, 2001; La Dictature libérale, éd. J.-Cl. Lattès, 1994, 
prix Jean-Jacques-Rousseau 1994; L'Aventure humanitaire, éd. Gallimard, 1994; Géopolitique de la 
faim – Faim et responsabilité, éd. PUF, 2004. 
2 La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, Genève 1954, Publications de la Sorbonne, 
1979; La nouvelle question d'Extrême-Orient, 1 L'ère de la guerre froide (1945-1959), Bibliothèque 
historique Payot, 1985; La nouvelle question d'Extrême-Orient, 2 L'ère du conflit sino-soviétique 
(1959-1978), Bibliothèque historique Payot, 1988- Préface de Jean-Baptiste Duroselle; La nouvelle 
question d'Extrême-Orient, 3 L'ère de l'ouverture chinoise (1979-1994) (inédit) ; Géopolitique de 
l'Extrême-Orient, Espaces et politiques, Bruxelles, Éditions Complexe, 1991, Collection Questions au 
XXe siècle; Géopolitique de l'Extrême-Orient, Frontières et stratégies, Bruxelles, Éditions Complexe, 
1993, Collection Questions au XXe siècle; La Tentation impériale. Politique extérieure de la Chine 
depuis 1949, éd. Imprimerie nationale, 1994; La Politique extérieure du Japon, PUF, 1993, Collection 
Que Sais-je?; La Politique extérieure de la Chine populaire, PUF, 1994, Collection Que sais-je?; 
L'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est, PUF, 1998 Collection Que sais-je?; Mao Tse-toung, 
Les Cahiers de l'Herne, 1972. 
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than the fact that reverting to cold-war (West-East) dynamics would again ascertain 
the specificity of that zone. 
g) national interest  enhance status leadership - Putin‟s style / “cyclical” 
presidency 
The national interest is a constant of geopolitical action as M.-F. Garaud (1934-)
1
 
reminds us in the case of France. It can be mobilised to analyse yet further the 
situation in the Balkans and Ukraine. Russian stances from the late 2000s in the 
Black Sea (Georgia, Ukraine, Crimea) correspond to the service of post-soviet 
Russian leadership status, in addition to other notable services, namely the active 
participation of Russia to the construction of both the “new Asia” and of the “new 
Eurasia”. The pursuit of the national interest cannot be disputed as being the 
common denominator of all governments and leaders. What has changed since the 
Westphalian order was begun in the mid-17th century, confirmed by the UN 
system of world management, is that international actions should be negotiated and 
accepted before being undertaken (which applies also to interventions in 1991 and 
2003 in the Middle East). The issue over Crimea is also one of time-dimensions 
and cyclical leaderships in Russia and Ukraine, as well as one of assertive versus 
constructive leaderships.  
i) can criticise ?  is Russia just another country/ cold war ideology / US position, 
G2 with China 
Russia‟s stances in the Balkans, justified for some and untimely for others, 
suggests to ask if it is possible to criticise Russia, a question which P. Boniface 
(1956-)
2 
asked about Israel‟s policies towards Palestine (Boniface, 2003, 2014). 
The issue is that of bias. For criticising a contemporary dynamic, one may be 
accused of stirring past deeds which belong to the past and ought not to be 
mobilised to account for present dynamics. It is certainly a biased analysis to 
equate what some call the “annexation” of Crimea (2014) by Russia with the 
                                                     
1 De l‟Europe en général et de la France en particulier, Le Pré aux clercs, coll. « Pamphlet », 1992; 
Maastricht, pourquoi non, Plon, 1992; La Fête des fous : qui a tué la Ve République ?, Plon, 2006; 
Impostures politiques, Plon, coll. « Tribune libre », 2010. 
2 La Puce, les hommes et la bombe: l'Europe face aux nouveaux défis technologiques et militaires, 
avec François Heisbourg, Hachette littérature, 1986; Vive la bombe : éloge de la dissuasion nucléaire, 
Édition no 1, 1992; Les Nouvelles Pathologies des États dans les relations internationales, Dunod, 
1993; Contre le révisionnisme nucléaire, Édition Marketing, 1994; La Puissance internationale, 
Dunod, 1994; La Volonté d'impuissance : la fin des ambitions internationales et stratégiques ?, 
Éditions du Seuil, 1996; Repenser la dissuasion nucléaire, Éditions de l'Aube, 1997; Les Guerres de 
demain, Éditions du Seuil, 2001; Le Monde contemporain : grandes lignes de partage, Presses 
universitaires de France, 2001; Le Monde contemporain : grandes lignes de partage, Presses 
universitaires de France, 2003; Le monde nucléaire : arme nucléaire et relations internationales depuis 
1945, avec Barthélémy Courmont, Armand Colin, 2006); Comprendre le monde, Armand Colin, 
2010; La Géopolitique : les relations internationales, Eyrolles, 2011. 
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annexation of Austria by Germany (1937). It is equally biased to equate criticism 
of Russia‟s today with and cold-war-type criticism of the past. If i) Russia did not 
annex Crimea in 2014 similarly to what happened in Austria in 1937, then ii) to 
criticise Russia today does not amount to an ideological primary anti-Russian 
attitude. Any country and any foreign policy can be criticised and this may lead to 
improvements in international relations. Russia and Europe and Ukraine could 
monitor the situation in the Balkans differently: the recent Putin-Hollande-Merlk 
meeting (6/2/2015) can be criticised as a modern Yalta “over the heads” of 
Ukrainians. 
j) track-2 diplomacy  to some extent - Lavroff / Lavroffisation / Sochi Olympics 
And so, finally, crisis-management can revert to track-II diplomacy as practiced by 
various IR Institutes in the world, notably at IFRI, led by Th. de Montbrial (1943-
)1. To be sure, the crisis over Ukraine and Crimea, just as many international crises 
since the cold war (over Iraq in 1990, over North-Korea since 1994,…) yield to 
various diplomatic dances-of-the-slow-snail. These dances mobilise forefront 
diplomats, here S. Lavroff in particular, and track-II actors, such as “experts”. They 
also mobilise international events not directly linked to diplomacy but attracting 
high international visibility, such as sporting events2. In this vein, the year 2014 
witnessed, all at once, the crisis in Ukraine and Crimea, the displaced G7-meeting 
(from Sochi-Russia to Brussels) and the Olympic Games in Sochi-Russia, where 
some Ukrainian athletes protested against the referendum held in Crimea (at the 
risk of being disqualified for breaking Olympic neutrality). Classic track-II 
conferences over Ukraine did and do complete the picture: crises are also 
“managed” by recourse to lay-mobilisations. 
This rapid promenade in the alleys opened by contemporary analysts of 
geopolitical determinants in the late 20th century usefully completes the reminders 
                                                     
1 L'énergie: le compte à rebours, J.-C. Lattès, 1978; La revanche de l'Histoire, Julliard, 1985; Que 
faire?: les grandes manœuvres du monde, La Manufacture, 1990; Mémoire du temps présent, 
Flammarion, 1996; Dictionnaire de stratégie (codirecteur avec Jean Klein), PUF, novembre 2000; La 
France du nouveau siècle (dir.), PUF, février 2002; L'action et le système du monde, PUF, février 
2002, 2e édition, coll. « Quadrige » octobre 2003; Réformes-révolutions: le cas de la France (dir.), 
PUF, 2003; Quinze ans qui bouleversèrent le monde, Dunod, octobre 2003; La guerre et la diversité 
du monde, L'Aube - Le Monde, 2004; Géographie politique, coll. « Que sais-je? », PUF, 2006; Vingt 
ans qui bouleversèrent le monde, édition Dunod, 2008; Journal de Russie – 1977 - 2011, published on 
March 1st, 2012. 
2 P. Boniface, L'Europe et le sport (dir.), Presses universitaires de France, 2001; La Terre est ronde 
comme un ballon: géopolitique du football, Édition du Seuil, 2002; Football & mondialisation, 
Armand Colin, 2006; De But en Blanc, avec Pape Diouf, Hachette, 2009; Football & mondialisation, 
Armand Colin, 2010; JO politiques, Gawsewitch Éditeur, 2012; Sport et géopolitique : une décennie 
de chroniques, Éditions du Cygne, 2013; Le sport, c'est bien plus que du sport !, avec Denis 
Masseglia, Gawsewitch Éditeur, 2013; Géopolitique du sport, Armand Colin, 2014. 
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of classic authors of the late 19th century. Applying all of these in order to make 
sense of events of the early 21st century (not “To use 21st c. tools to hold Russia 
accountable for 19th c. behaviour”…) suggests that what is at stake is not 
particularly just Russia or Ukraine or even Crimea, but broader dynamics. Russia is 
acting but as a western-Eurasian power belonging to an Asia that is more and more 
China-inspired. Europe is an actor but also a Union more and more inclined to 
manage initiatives and crises as a continental power, which raises for Europe the 
every decision to (partly) des-atlanticise its security. 
In conclusion of part I of this article, Russia is at a crossroad between vertical 
determination (annexing Crimea) and multilateral construction (constructing the 
Eurasian EEC)? This is suggested for at least three reasons. 
First, adjustments are massive and numerous in the post-cold war, not just in the 
zone of the Black Sea, Ukraine, Crimea, or even in the whole of the zone “in 
between” Eurasia and Europe. It is a much more widespread phenomenon and 
therefore particular dynamics must be analysed from a wide perspective. The post-
cold war international order is questioning many givens inherited from the cold 
war, for instance Euro-African relations, Sino-Russian relations, South Asian 
dynamics, East-Asian construction, Latin-American assertions, etc. 
Second, the nature of international power is affected by the opening of the political 
borders in the world since 1991, and is therefore evolving, from an essentially 
political and military nature, to an economic nature at large, and particularly 
commercial and financial. It is necessary to analyse events again according to 
economic cycles, in the neo-critical manner of, for instance, S. Amir and E. 
Wallerstein1. More generally than the neo-critical approach, we suggest that the 
                                                     
1 By Samir Amin, of interest, see: Les effets structurels de l‟intégration internationale des économies 
précapitalistes. Une étude théorique du mécanisme qui a engendré les économies dites sous-
développées (thèse), 1957; L‟accumulation à l‟échelle mondiale, 1970; La crise de l'impérialisme, 
1975; L‟impérialisme et le développement inégal, 1976; Transforming the world-economy?: nine 
critical essays on the new international economic order.,1984; La Méditerranée dans le système 
mondial, 1988; Transforming the revolution: social movements and the world system, 1990; Le grand 
tumulte, 1991; L‟Empire du chaos, 1991; La gestion capitaliste de la crise, 1995; Les défis de la 
mondialisation, 1996; Obsolescent Capitalism, 2003; Du capitalisme à la civilisation, Éditions 
Syllepse, 2008; L'Implosion du capitalisme contemporain. Automne du capitalisme, printemps des 
peuples?, Éditions Delga, 2012. By Imma Wallerstein, of interest, see: Capitalisme et économie-
monde, 1450-1640, Ed. Flammarion, 1980; Le mercantilisme et la consolidation de l'économie-
monde européenne, 1600-1750, Tome II: Le Système du monde du XVe siècle à nos jours, Ed. 
Flammarion, 1984; Le capitalisme historique, Ed. La Découverte, 1985 [nouvelle édition 2002, avec 
Postface: "La mondialisation n'est pas nouvelle."]; Le grand tumulte? Les mouvements sociaux dans 
l'économie-monde (avec S. Amin, G. Arrighi & A.G. Frank) Ed. La Découverte, 1991; L'Après-
libéralisme: Essai sur un système-Monde à réinventer, Ed. La Tour d'Aigues: Éditions de l'Aube, 
1999; Comprendre le monde. Introduction à l'analyse des système-monde, Editions La Découverte, 
2006. Réédité en poche en 2009. 
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present Black Sea dynamic is affected by the economic crises either in Russia, 
Europe or the world at large. 
Third, above all, the change taking place in the world at present, and therefore also 
in the former Soviet zone, is one from vertical to multilateral dynamics. That is to 
say, it is no longer appropriate or even possible for a State to act according to 
unilateral ways or even strict bilateral ways. This means that (unilaterally) neither 
Russian in the Black Sea, nor the USA in international politics, whether around 
Ukraine or in Afghanistan, nor China for that matter, can succeed long in seeking 
to initiate domination. This also means that (bilaterally) neither Russia with only 
China can seek to dominate Asia, nor the USA with only the EU can seek to 
dominate western Eurasia. 
Coming to Russian foreign policy in the present times, Russia has “no choice” but 
the multilateral SCO format, together with five other members and in a collective 
dynamic of, altogether, sixteen “SCO-affiliated” countries, which is both inevitable 
for Russia and uncomfortable: risking to appear as the “armed arm” of China 
(against the West), in Ukraine or elsewhere. Or else, Russia is acting in a way that 
paves the way for the enlarging EEC, another multilateral initiative, involving large 
parts of the CIS space, also in a competition with China, but an economic 
competition, not a military one as with the CSTO. 
The latest official data published by the European Commission talk about weak 
economic performance in 2013, stagnation in 2014 and a little future recovery in 
2015. The potential risks for the Russian economy are high inflation rate, rouble 
depreciation and fiscal outlook deteriorating (European Commission, 2014, p. 
124). 
Another study highlights that the decline of the oil and gas prices on international 
market and the difficulty to attract foreign investment after Russia‟s military 
intervention in Ukraine support a negative macroeconomic evolution in Russia in 
2014 and 2015 (Central Investigation Agency, 2014). 
An interesting approach is that Ukraine-Russia conflict is a family conflict, which 
started as a result of Ukraine‟s option to a future adhering to NATO. This is why 
Russia was “forced” to start the military actions against Ukraine (Saunders, 2014, 
p. 1). 
The Ukraine‟s economy has bad perspectives, because its industrial areas are under 
conflict. Moreover, the national currency is plummeting. This is why IMF 
approved the second loan for Ukraine (1.4 billion USD). This loan is focused on 
five important economic areas: a sharp currency devaluation, which will increase 
the cost of all imported goods, a government-funded bailout for domestic banks, 
government spending cuts, measures to regulate money laundering and a sharp 
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increase in energy prices. Ukraine asks for urgent international financing (Burke 
Michael, 2014, p. 2). An interesting point of view is that the pro-European and 
anti-Russian bastion in Ukraine is Lvov region, where 30% of the population lives 
below the poverty limit (Ernu, 2014, p. 2). 
 
3. The Russian Economy under the Crisis’ Impact 
After high economic growth rates during 2010-2012, Russia faced to the economic 
contraction in 2013 and 2014. The forecast economic growth of 2.0% in 2015 will 
support a little economic recovery (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. GDP growth rate in Russia (%) 
Source: personal contribution 
The real risk for the Russian economy is related to escalation of the conflict in 
region and imposition of sanctions (European Commission, 2014, p. 125). 
As a result of the regional crisis, Russia faces to a negative net export of good and 
services even that it decreased dramatically its imports during 2012-2014 (see 
Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Net exports’ trend in Russia (%) 
Source: personal contribution 
The imposition of sanctions against Russia supported the employment‟s decrease 
and the increase in unemployment rate. This trend will continue in 2015, as well 
(see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Employment and unemployment’ trends in Russia (%) 
Source: personal contribution 
On the other hand, the inflation rate is still high in 2014 and will decrease slowly in 
2015 (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Inflation rate’s trend in Russia (%) 
Source: personal contribution 
Maybe the single positive economic evolution is that connected to the budget 
deficit, which is unchanged from 2013 (0.5% of GDP) and which will increase to 
1.0% of GDP in 2015. This situation is supported by little government gross debts, 
even their trend is positive (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Budget indicators (% of GDP) 
Indicator 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
General government balance -1.2 4.2 2.8 0.6 0.3 -0.3 
General government gross debt 11.0 11.7 12.5 13.6 14.3 14.8 
In Table 1, the budget situation depends heavily on the price of oil, which is 
considered to remain above 100 USD/bbl in 2014 and 2015. 
Russia is placed at 53rd position in the world under the competitiveness criteria. 
This position was supported by better domestic competition, ICT use and business 
sophistication. On the other hand, Russia faces to inefficient institutional 
framework (world rank 97th), corruption and favouritism (92nd) and re-establish 
trust in the independence of the judiciary (109th) (World Economic Forum, 2014, 
p.6). 
 
4. The Ukrainian Economy under the Crisis’ Impact 
The Ukrainian economy faces to a deep recession. The GDP in 2013 represented 
85% from the same GDP in 1992, even that Ukraine has a lot of rare materials. 
Moreover, there are great economic disparities between the Ukrainian regions (see 
Table 2). 
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Table 2. Ukrainian administrative divisions by GRP per capita (in USD) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea  930 1260 1604 2094 2638 1788 2080 2452 
Cherkasy Oblast  912 1303 1625 2046 2768 1847 2183 2655 
Chernihiv Oblast  970 1263 1527 1996 2508 1684 1941 2438 
Chernivtsi Oblast 675 908 1119 1459 1855 1204 1378 1666 
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 1618 2324 3017 4132 5870 3560 4374 5298 
Donetsk Oblast  1826 2437 3114 3999 4942 2969 3653 4590 
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast  985 1349 1615 1991 2457 1602 1867 2441 
Kharkiv Oblast  1350 1761 2248 3098 4043 2724 2979 3522 
Kherson Oblast  854 1115 1335 1608 2268 1573 1808 2140 
Khmelnytskyi Oblast  855 1125 1391 1802 2265 1512 1714 2174 
Kiev Oblast 1250 1692 2162 2977 3910 2794 3294 4335 
Kirovohrad Oblast 963 1247 1529 1890 2566 1681 1957 2508 
Kyiv City 4348 5617 6972 9860 11694 7841 8875 10041 
Luhansk Oblast  1123 1586 1997 2698 3481 2126 2494 3157 
Lviv Oblast  1014 1299 1653 2161 2639 1809 2061 2580 
Mykolaiv Oblast  1208 1522 1934 2421 3071 2188 2555 2947 
Odessa Oblast  1321 1682 2055 2738 3728 2611 2841 3243 
Poltava Oblast  1662 2258 2837 3663 4267 2867 3737 4439 
Rivne Oblast 905 1223 1529 1920 2319 1501 1737 2107 
Sevastopol City 1099 1454 1996 2566 3150 2178 2578 3094 
Sumy Oblast  941 1268 1554 2029 2586 1749 1980 2494 
Ternopil Oblast 661 898 1152 1487 1839 1314 1476 1896 
Vinnytsia Oblast  883 1164 1451 1814 2290 1559 1806 2238 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Volyn Oblast 897 1226 1465 1923 2343 1514 1754 2140 
Zakarpattia Oblast  797 1048 1302 1673 2017 1294 1547 1820 
Zaporizhia Oblast 1521 2084 2647 3569 4411 2646 2981 3472 
Zhytomyr Oblast  826 1084 1314 1680 2192 1465 1842 2164 
Ukraine 1367 1829 2303 3068 3891 2545 2974 3588 
Source: Ukraine Regional Dataset, 2013 
According to data in Table 2, the regional dispersion is presented in Figure 5. The 
low developed regions in Ukraine are the Western regions, while the developed 
regions are the Eastern regions. Even Autonomous Republic of Crimea has a GRP 
higher than the Eastern regions. 
 
Figure 5. Disparities related to Gross Regional Product in Ukraine 
Source: personal contribution 
The macroeconomic trend during 2008-2013 is presented in Figure 6. The forecast 
for 2014 is negative -8.0% (Central Investigation Agency, 2014). 
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Figure 6. GDP trend in Ukraine 
Source: personal contribution 
This macroeconomic evolution was supported by high unemployment rates (8.0% 
in 2013, for example) and normal inflation rates (0.7% in 2013). 
On the other hand, Ukraine faced to an increase in the public debt, which achieved 
40.6% of GDP in 2013. The public debt consists of domestic public debt, external 
public debt and sovereign guarantees (see Figure 7). 
Figure 7. Public debt in Ukraine (2013) 
Source: personal contribution 
In 2014, Ukraine achieved better world rank (76th), even that it still faces to great 
challenges as: the institutional framework (130th), decreasing the dominance of 
large companies in domestic markets (129th) and making markets more 
competitive (125th) and more efficient (112th). 
On the other hand, restoring peace in Eastern Ukraine is undoubtedly the country‟s 
highest priority (World Economic Forum, 2014, p.7). 
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5. The Ukrainian Crisis’ Impact on Ukraine-Russia-EU28-USA trade 
Relations 
The Ukraine‟s exports achieved 71.14 billion USD in 2013 and covered: ferrous 
and nonferrous metals, fuel and petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and 
transport equipment and food products. The main export partners were: EU28, 
Russia, Turkey and Egypt (EEAS, 2014). The Ukraine‟s imports covered 87.21 
billion USD in the same year, 2013, and consisted of natural gas, machinery and 
equipment and chemicals. The main import partners were: EU28, Russia, China, 
Germany, Belarus and Poland (see Figure 8). 
Ukraine‟s exports 
 
Ukraine‟s imports 
                              
 
Figure 7. Ukraine’s foreign trade (2013) Source: personal contribution 
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According to Figure 8, Ukraine‟s main foreign trade partners are EU and Russia. 
Russia has to maintain high exports in order to pay its imports of sophisticated 
industrial goods. EU is the main export partner for Russia, as well. This is why the 
European imposition of sanctions affected the Russian economy (Adomanis, 2014, 
p. 3). 
On the other hand, three Eastern Ukrainian regions (Harkov, Dnepropetrovsk and 
Poltava) cover the greatest part of the exports. 
The EU-Ukraine agreement signing leads to partial loss of the economic 
connections with Russia and the Custom Union, which will support a great 
budgetary deficit (an annual flow of 15-20 billion USD). Moreover, Ukraine‟s 
external debts are distributed between USA (80%), Russia (6.5%), EU28 (4.3%) 
and China (4.3%). This is why, USA, Russia, EU28 and China negotiated their 
spheres of economic influence at the end of 2013. USA will invest in energy and 
lands, Russia will take the military industry, the energy transport and different 
infrastructures, China will focus on Crimea harbor and lands and EU28 is 
interested in many economic projects.  
On 4th of March 2014, Ukraine signed a financial agreement related to a loan of 
610 million Euros from EU28. On the other hand, Ukraine signed a preliminary 
agreement with IMF regarding a loan of 17 billion USD. There is a powerful 
interdependence relationship between Russian and Ukrainian economies. Ukraine 
is the most important transit country for the Russian natural gas to EU28. Russia 
tried to bypass Ukraine by building North Stream and South Stream gas pipelines. 
On the other hand, EU28 tries to decrease its dependence by the Russian gas. 
The next step of this conflict is that Russia will be forced to produce itself the main 
products imported from Ukraine and, probably, from the EU28, when Ukraine will 
be able to adhere to the EU (Dembitski A., 2014, p.2). 
In conclusion of Part II of this co-authored article, Ukraine‟s conflict is far away of 
finishing. The economic, political and strategically interests are too high to support 
a rapid solution in this geographic area. The main global economic and military 
actors (USA, Russia, EU28 and China) have their own interests in Ukraine and 
fight to obtain more advantages. EU28 tries to become more active in this region 
with its adhering partnership for Ukraine.  
A compromise is possible with compensations for the other interested global 
actors. Perhaps, at least a part of Ukraine will become member of the EU on 
medium term. On long term, the solution will result from the economic 
performances of EU28 vs Russia, which will be able to guide population and 
regions to one or another regional organization. 
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6. Conclusions 
According to the above complex analysis, Ukraine is just a point on the political-
military chase table. The stake of this game is immeasurably greater. The main 
global actors try to obtain more advantages in the region. The historical approach 
supports the idea that Russia had and has greater interests in region. Moreover, the 
latest events implemented Russia‟s wish to restore the red empire. 
EU28 became more active in region using its proposal to attract Ukraine to the 
European Union, at least on medium term. Moreover, EU28 play the role of 
potential lender for Ukraine. 
USA is traditionally present in the region, as long as it is the possibility to convince 
Ukraine to adhere to NATO. 
There are at least two other countries directly interested in the problem: Moldova 
and Romania, which try to find the best strategically, military and political 
solutions to avoid direct conflict with Russia.  
The cultural, ethnical, religious and linguistic aspects are very important for a final 
solution. And this solution will be not a military one. Unfortunately, Ukraine will 
have the same statute as Cyprus: a part of Ukraine will remain under Russian 
administration, while the other one will adhere (maybe under an emergency 
procedure) to the European Union. Maybe the most important aspect of this 
research is that the forced territorial reorganization is possible in the 21st century in 
Europe. 
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